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1 Introduction
Hourly fees prevail as the typical fee arrangement for lawyers’ services in many
countries. It is argued that an hourly fee creates an incentive for the lawyer to
devote sufficient time and effort to a case. As Rhode (1985, 635) puts it “[M]ost
lawyers will prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can charge
by the stone.” Consequently, fixed fees are said to be infrequent because they elicit
minimal effort on the lawyer’s side, which is against a client’s best interest.
This argumentation, however, is not uncontested. Other commentators propose
the alternative hypothesis that hourly rates prevail due to law firms enjoying market
power, given the informational problems involved (Hadfield 2000). Indeed, legal
services have the characteristics of credence goods: clients often do not know exactly
what services they need, nor how much they should pay for them (Dulleck and
Kerschbamer 2006). Lawyers can exploit these informational advantages as clients
suffer from search costs. A typical web site of a law firm only states that the firm
charges an hourly fee depending on the complexity of the case and the financial
strength of the client. To find out what that means, one needs to discuss the case
extensively with a lawyer in person. Thus, even if a first consultation is for free –
which is most often not the case – the client must invest a considerable amount of
time to acquire a quote. It further logically follows that for most clients it would
be costly to obtain more information through soliciting competing offers from other
lawyers.
Switching costs are another source of a lawyers’ market power as clients must
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duplicate an investment specific to their current lawyer when changing to another
lawyer (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). Indeed, once a client has chosen a lawyer who
has started on the case, the “investment” in this lawyer accumulates. Switching to
another lawyer would imply the duplication of these start-up costs. Furthermore,
there are institutional barriers to entry so that competitive pressure from potential
entrants is limited. The right to proceed in a Dutch civil court is reserved to lawyers
admitted to the Bar Association. In addition, professional regulation restricts com-
petition between registered lawyers as professional rules imply numerous limitations
on how lawyers may pursue their business (Baarsma and Felso˝ 2005).
Following this second line of reasoning, hourly fees are offered because law firms
have market power: compared to other arrangements such fees lead only to a more
expensive bill, while not necessarily rendering better services, especially if the case is
relatively standard. A recent article in The Economist (2011) summarizes this view:
“Law firms were often charging stiff rates for routine work [...]. Clients are right to
demand better value for money. [...] They are asking for flat or capped rather than
hourly fees.”1 This reasoning is also in line with Winston et al.’s (2011 6) broader
point that deregulating the market for legal services would stimulate competition
which, in turn, would encourage lawyers to experiment with alternative billing prac-
tices: “To [...] improve social welfare, [...] deregulating entry by individuals and
firms into the legal profession is desirable to force lawyers to compete more intensely
with each other [...].”
In this paper we test the alternative hypothesis that hourly rates are not neces-
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sarily in the interest of clients but that market power allows firms to charge them.
In particular, we investigate what type of contract clients prefer for assistance in a
legal dispute in Dutch civil courts. Our data consists of 196 bids offered in 51 Dutch
auctions where lawyers compete to represent a client in a case. This format of selling
legal services is unusual in that it both forces lawyers to compete directly against
each other and allows clients to compare different offers. Indeed, and contrary to
what is also common practice in the Netherlands, instead of only observing hourly
rates, different fee arrangements are being offered in the auctions. The clients’ choice
set therefore includes different types of bids. As a consequence, our dataset offers a
rather unique opportunity to study client preferences in a setting that is arguably
more competitive than the usual market for legal services. Clients not choosing
hourly rates in this setting would support the alternative hypothesis that legal firms
offer hourly rates because they have market power in the usual market.
The auction format we investigate is organized by XS2Justice (XS2J), a franchise
network for legal service providers in the Netherlands. In each auction, about three
to five potential bidders are invited from a shortlist of approximately 50 small- and
medium-sized Dutch law firms. Several types of fee arrangements are observed in
the auction: hourly rates, fixed fees, and “mixed fees,” which are time-capped fixed
fees plus an hourly rate for any additional hours should the case take longer than
expected.2 Clients are typically private people and small- and medium-sized compa-
nies. Their legal problems include cases that appear in Dutch civil courts, such as
labor disputes for individuals and collecting debts for businesses. Each client who
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signs a contract with a lawyer through the XS2J auctions pays the lawyer: there
is no fee-shifting, and clients do not qualify for legal aid and do not possess a legal
expenses insurance.
We estimate a client’s choice of fee arrangement while controlling for the level of
each bid, auction-specific circumstances, and other features of bidders that clients
directly observe or that might influence their choices. We find that hourly rates are
clearly the least-preferred bids. These findings are robust when including several
dimensions of lawyers’ bid experience in the auctions, and when distinguishing be-
tween different types of cases and clients; hourly rate bids are not chosen. Thus,
while our clients have the choice to go purely for hourly rates, they overwhelmingly
do not choose these bids.
The legal profession often argues that lawyers may be inclined to cut corners if
they are not paid on an hourly basis. We therefore approached the clients ex-post and
asked for their opinion of the services of the lawyers they selected through the XS2J
auctions: (very) satisfactory, passable or unsatisfactory. All the clients we were able
to reach were willing to confide to us their level of satisfaction, which thus excludes
the possibility of sample selection bias. Only one client expressed an unsatisfactory
service, and we find no statistically significant differences between satisfaction level
and type of bid. This indicates that fee arrangements that include flat fees do not
lower a lawyer’s effort for a (standard) case acquired through the auction under
investigation.
We additionally provide further context for the Dutch market for legal services
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and the XS2J auctions. First, we verify that the XS2J cases are a representative
sample of Dutch civil court cases. Second, we show that although the non-auction
cases have similar characteristics, law offices’ fee structures in general are heavily
biased toward hourly fees outside the auctions. We give economic and historical
rationales for why hourly fees prevail in the Dutch market for legal services. Finally,
we provide a logic for why the XS2J auctions cause the form of compensation to
change.
We are not the first to study different remuneration structures for legal services.
Kritzer (2009) provides an elaborate overview of several fee regimes.3 Hadfield (2000)
discusses the implications of hourly fees and task-based fees and argues that these
fee arrangements enhance the monopoly power of the legal profession. Finally, Smith
and Cox (1985) present empirical evidence of law firms offering hourly versus fixed
fee contracts for standard cases. Based on a survey of 1,500 US lawyers, they observe
that the larger and more known a law firm, the more likely it is to offer an hourly
fee contract. These fee arrangements are found to be more expensive than fixed fees,
both because they include higher effective hourly rates and because they budget more
hours per case. While the authors attribute their findings to a signaling of quality,
their results are also fully consistent with these larger firms enjoying a higher market
power. To our knowledge, however, thanks to our unique dataset we are the first to
be able to present empirical evidence of clients’ choice of fee arrangements, and thus
of the merits of lawyers’ still most-often used hourly rates.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the data, while section 3
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contains our empirical implementation. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of our
empirical framework and of an ex-post survey among clients, respectively. Section 6
includes a discussion of our findings and section 7 concludes.
2 Data
This section introduces the data. In the first subsection we give background informa-
tion on the XS2J auctions. In subsection 2.2 we summarize the rules of the auction.
We present summary statistics on bids and choices in subsection 2.3.
2.1 Background
The XS2J auctions are an often-used byproduct of the core business of XS2J, a
franchise network for legal service providers. The franchisees of XS2J are legally
skilled professionals who provide advice and assist clients in resolving disputes outside
the court system. However, as they are not members of the Bar Association, they
normally cannot represent their clients in court. In situations where XS2J franchisees
cannot take on a case, or when the client explicitly requests a lawyer, the case is put
up for auction.
Like in most countries, law firms in the Netherlands are divided into two broad
categories: on the one hand there are a handful of top law firms employing a large
number of lawyers who perform highly specialized services, often on behalf of large
multinational firms. On the other hand, there exists a large number of smaller law
firms with usually a small number of lawyers who offer a broad range of routine
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services to private people and small/medium-sized firms. The bidders in the XS2J
auction are from the second category: the typical law firm in the auctions has one
or two offices with about 15 lawyers in total.4
The client in the XS2J auctions is either a private person or a small/medium-sized
enterprise. The private persons are typically middle-income. Clients with low income
are eligible for legal aid, where the fees for lawyers are fixed by the government. At
the same time, we do not have any indication of having clients from the top tail of the
income distribution, since the disputed amounts are fairly moderate (see also table 3
further on). Similarly, large firms usually have in-house legal professionals who deal
with the routine cases that are auctioned through the XS2J auctions. Furthermore,
these large firms are in a position to shop around and acquire relatively costless a
competitive offer from a law firm without the assistance of an intermediary such as
XS2J.
The cases on which bidding is invited are typical civil court disputes of private
people – family matters, labor disputes, and consumer disputes – and the usual
conflicts of small/medium-sized businesses – contract disputes and collecting debts.
Criminal cases or highly specialized fields of law such as competition law are not allo-
cated through the XS2J auctions. At the same time, the production of standardized
documents such as wills, marital agreements, and conveyancing services fall outside
the scope of law firms in the Netherlands. The production of these documents is
monopolized by another type of legal professionals called “notaries.”5
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2.2 The rules of the auction
Each auction starts with XS2J sending out invitations to a number of law firms.
The invitation is accompanied by a brief description of the case, as well as a clear
formulation of what services the lawyers are expected to submit a bid on; for example,
legal advice, a second opinion on a contract, representation in court, and so forth.
Bidders do not know the identity of the other candidates.
After the bids have been made, an XS2J jurist discusses the different bids with the
client. Apart from the financial details and potential comments made by the lawyers,
clients receive information on the experience of the lawyers concerned, namely the
number of years they have been practicing law. The client is informed of which
city the lawyers have their offices, but the lawyers’ name and exact address are not
revealed in advance. Subsequently, the client makes her choice of bid. The lawyers
who submitted a bid but were not selected by the client, receive information on the
financial terms of the winning bid (type and amount), office location, and professional
experience measured in the number of years the winning bidder has been in practice.
2.3 Bids and choices
Our sample contains information on all the auctions that were organized by XS2J
in the period November 2004 to December 2008. All bids are observed, except for a
limited number of (non-win) bids.6 In total, the dataset contains 95 auctions in which
374 bids are submitted. Of course, for obvious statistical reasons we restrict ourselves
to cases in which at least two bids were made and where one of the bids was chosen as
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the winner.7 There were five cases awarded where only a single bid was present and
27 cases were not awarded; these have been dropped from our sample. Furthermore,
some auctions include bids based on a success fee, that is, where remuneration of
the lawyer depends in some way on the outcome of the case. Given the complexity
and questionable legal status in the Netherlands, auctions with success fee bids are
excluded from the sample.8 It must be noted, however, that our results are virtually
identical when including these bids in the estimations as a separate category “success
fees.” The final sample that is used for our analysis contains 196 bids submitted in
51 auctions.
[Insert table 1 about here]
This sample contains hourly fee bids, fixed fee bids, and mixed bids (recall that
mixed bids are time-capped fixed fees plus an hourly rate for any additional hours
should the case take longer than expected). Table 1 shows the auctions divided up
according to the combination of bid types available. This gives us a first insight
into how hourly rate bids fare against fixed fee bids and mixed fee bids, respectively.
For example, as can be seen from the first row, there are 15 auctions where the
three bid types are simultaneously offered. In the auctions with this combination
of bid types, a total number of 22 fixed fee bids, 25 mixed fee bids and 26 hourly
fee bids are present. However, while the hourly rates slightly outnumber the fixed
and mixed fee bids, they win only in three of the 15 auctions where all bid types
are available (whereas a mixed fee bid wins nine times, and a fixed fee three times).
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For different combinations of the present bid types, the same pattern is repeated.
Although hourly rate bids outnumber fixed or mixed fee bids in all auction types,
hourly bids are less often chosen as the winner. These numbers hint at hourly
fees being the least-preferred choice of clients. However, in order to identify a true
causal relationship between the bid type and chances of winning, we revert to our
econometric framework.
3 Empirical Implementation
First we explain the variables we use and then introduce our estimation strategy. We
define our dependent variable Winik as a dummy which takes the value 1 when the
submitted bid i was selected by the client in auction k, and 0 otherwise; see table 2
for the exact definition of this and all subsequent variables.
[Insert table 2 about here]
Our prime explanatory variables are, of course, the type of bids offered. These
are defined as dummy variables: Fixedik, Mixedik and Hourlyik, respectively.
Furthermore, we include a measure for the price level of each bid. Note that it is
not straightforward to rank bids in terms of expected payment, given the different
bid types present. Table 3 provides some insight into this heterogeneity. The hourly
fee bids are in the range of e100 to e268 per hour, the fixed fee bids are in the range
of e150 to e6,360 in total, whereas the mixed bids show an average fixed fee part of
e2,179 and an additional hourly fee part of e154 per hour if the cap is exceeded.9
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[Insert table 3 about here]
Thus, clients have to make their choices with no ex-ante information on the
number of hours that a particular lawyer will work on a case.10 We therefore propose
a definition that is based on a “mechanical” ex-ante calculation of payment that
requires no knowledge of the hours that a lawyer will spend on the case. In particular,
we define a bid to be higher (a dummy variable higherik) if there is at least one other
bid that yields a lower payment to the client for all possible ex-post number of hours
worked.11 Thus, a fixed fee is classified as higher when there is at least one other
fixed fee which is lower. Likewise, an hourly fee is higher if there is at least one
hourly fee that is lower. Furthermore, given their somewhat higher complexity, we
give for the mixed fee bids two examples of our definition in an appendix at the end
of this text. Note that a mixed fee bid can in some circumstances be compared to a
fixed or an hourly fee. Indeed, when a mixed fee bid has a higher flat fee part than a
competing fixed fee, it can be labeled as “higher,” as for any number of hours worked
on the case the mixed fee will yield a higher payment than the fixed fee. Similarly, a
mixed fee may yield a higher payment for any possible realization of hours compared
to a relatively low hourly fee.
[Insert table 4 about here]
A client’s choice of the winning bid may not only depend on the type and the
level of the bids. Besides bid characteristics, clients’ information on bidder charac-
teristics may influence their choice. As said, clients are informed of the length of
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the professional experience of lawyers (in number of years). In the absence of other
signals, this might provide information for the client as she may believe that more
experienced lawyers are better than inexperienced lawyers. As each client can only
choose from her own choice set, we include professional experience in relative terms:
the ratio between the experience of the lawyer with bid i and the experience of the
most experienced bidder who submitted a bid in a given auction k, which defines the
variable Experienceik.
Second, although the client is not informed of the identity of the lawyer, she
is told in which town the lawyer has his office. As the client potentially needs
to visit the lawyers’ office on a number of occasions, it may be that she takes the
geographical distance between her own residence and the lawyer’s office into account.
We include the lawyer-client distance relative to the most distant lawyer in the
auction.12 Descriptive statistics for all our variables are given in table 4.
Our main specification can thus be summarized as follows:
Winik = β1Fixedik + β2Mixedik+
β3Higherik + β4Experienceik + β5Distanceik + ηik, (1)
where i indexes bid and k indexes auction. We take hourly fee bids as the base
and therefore include only fixed and mixed fees as explanatory bid-type variables;
the coefficient estimates on fixed and mixed fee bids should thus be interpreted as
relative to hourly rates. The remaining variables are the height of bid Higherik, the
relative experience of the bidding lawyer Experienceik and relative distance of the
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lawyer’s office Distanceik, and ηik is the error term.
We estimate the above model with the conditional logit estimator. This estimator
fits maximum likelihood models with a dichotomous dependent variable (a winning
or losing bid in the auction). Conditional logistic analysis differs from a simple
logistic regression in that the data are grouped – per auction in our case – and the
likelihood is calculated relative to other bids in each auction. Our methodology
has the advantage that it controls for unobserved differences due to the size of the
choice set (the number of bids available per auction), as well as other unobserved
case-specific characteristics (see, for example, Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, for a
comprehensive explanation). Furthermore, we allow standard errors to be clustered
on the auction level. Thus, we take into account that bids in the same auction may
be correlated and estimates of standard errors are accordingly adjusted.
For clarity, here we give a brief, formal explanation of how a conditional logit
estimator works. Let k = 1, ..., 51 denote the 51 auctions and i = 1, .., Tk be the bids
in the kth auction. The outcomes in an auction k can then be represented together
as Wink = (Win1k,Win2k, ...,WinTkk). In each auction, only one bid wins and thus
per auction k there is only one Winik = 1 while the others take a value of 0. This
means that
Tk∑
i=1
Winik = 1. For ease of notation, let the right-hand side variables
of our main equation (1) be represented by xikβ. The conditional probability of a
possible value of Wink can then be written as
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Pr(Wink|
Tk∑
i=1
Winik = 1) =
exp
(
Tk∑
i=1
Winikxikβ
)
∑
dk∈Sk exp
(
Tk∑
i=1
dikxikβ
) , (2)
where dik is an indicator equal to 0 or 1,
Tk∑
i=1
dik = 1, Sk the set of all possible
combinations of one winning bid and Tk − 1 losing bids in auction k.
However, while the conditional logit estimator nicely corrects for the number of
bids in an auction, it still assumes that a particular choice between two bid types is
not influenced by a third alternative bid type. Thus, our estimator assumes “inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA), which translates into assuming that the
errors are independent; see, for example, Train (2009) for a detailed discussion. If
the IIA assumption is violated, the conditional logit may in theory yield wrong sub-
stitution patterns. While Kropko (2010) shows that in practice a violation of the
IIA assumption does not lead to worse estimations for simple logit models than more
complicated estimators, we will show in the results section that the IIA assumption
holds for our sample.
Furthermore, one might argue that lawyers’ participation in previous XS2J auc-
tions may increase their chances of winning. Bidding experience could have an in-
direct effect through XS2J’s selection to the auction of lawyers who performed well
in the past. These lawyers may potentially be of a higher quality and it may be
possible to transmit this difference to clients in some way, for example, through the
comments they make. We will show, however, that several dimensions of lawyers’
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bid experience have no impact on their chances of winning. Moreover, we will give a
tentative interpretation of our results in terms of price versus quality of legal services.
Finally, our main equation (1) estimates an average choice over all cases and
clients. Although the cases in our sample are relatively standard and clients do not
include very wealthy persons or large companies, it may still be that the choices of
bids are heterogeneous across different types of cases or clients. Indeed, lawyers often
argue that more complex cases or clients require hourly fee rates, since this is in the
best interest of the client. We will, therefore, investigate whether clients’ preferences
differ depending on the case and client characteristics.
4 Results
We first show our main results and the validity of the IIA assumption. We then show
that several dimensions of lawyers’ bid experience and case or client characteristics
have no impact on the chances of winning a case, and give a tentative interpretation
of our results.
4.1 Main results
For all our conditional logit estimations the relative odds ratios are reported, as these
are easier to interpret than marginal probabilities; see, for example, Long and Freese
(2006) for an excellent exposition on this topic. In short, the odds of an event is the
probability of an event taking place, divided by the probability of that same event
not taking place. Take, for example, the odds for fixed fee bids in our setting. If pF
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represents the probability of a fixed fee winning, then the odds for a winning fixed
fee are pF/(1− pF ). Given that we compare fixed fee bids with hourly fee bids (the
“baseline” in our regressions), and pH being the probability of an hourly rate bid
winning, the odds of fixed fee bids relative to hourly rates’ odds are pF /(1−pF )
pH/(1−pH) . A
coefficient that is larger than one (smaller than one) would therefore indicate that
the odds of a fixed fee winning are better (worse) than the odds of an hourly fee. In
fact, it reflects a factor change: a coefficient of 2 doubles the odds of winning, while
that of 0.5 halves it. The exact same logic holds for the coefficient of mixed fee bids,
as this is the third possible bid type.
In terms of model fit we present the value of the log likelihood ratio at conver-
gence, the χ2 value and the number of correct predictions of the estimation, which
corresponds to the percentage of auctions where our model picks the right winner
(“auction hit rate”). The benchmark for evaluation is a na¨ıve predictor where each
bid has an equal chance of winning. This amounts to each bid in auction k containing
Tk bids having a winning chance of
1
Tk
, averaged over all 51 auctions in our sample,
that is, 1
51
51∑
k=1
1
Tk
. This na¨ıve predictor in our sample yields a 32% chance of winning.
We first report the estimation with only the three types of bids. As can be seen
from column (1) in table 5, a fixed fee bid increases the odds of winning over four
times, relative to bidding with an hourly fee (1% significance level). The relative
odds of winning for the mixed fee bids, again relative to hourly rate bids, is over
seven times (1% significance level). The same pattern, order of magnitude, and
level of significance can be observed when consecutively adding our measure of what
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constitutes a higher bid (column (2)), the level of experience, and the distance of the
law firm’s offices to the client (column (3)).
[Insert table 5 about here]
For the control variables, the reported odds ratios are the multiplicative effect of
a change in a given variable on the odds of any given type of bid. First, the bids
that are labeled as higher have a significantly lower chance of winning (at the 1%
significance level). The coefficient of 0.171 in column (3) means that if, for example,
a fixed fee bid changed to “higher,” then the odds of winning the auction for this
fixed fee would decrease by more than a factor of 5, holding the values for the other
bid alternatives constant. On the other hand, the odds of winning are more than
twice as high if the lawyer is more experienced (significant at the 10% level), as
can be seen in column (3). Furthermore, while having offices at a relatively larger
distance decreases the odds of winning (with a coefficient of 0.419), its impact is not
significant.
In terms of model fit, our estimations correctly predict the winning bid in an
auction between 71% and 80% of the cases. Therefore, our estimations perform
considerably better than the na¨ıve auction hit rate of 32%.
4.2 Independence of irrelevant alternatives
As said, our estimates rely on the IIA assumption holding true. IIA holds if the
odds of winning for one type of bid over another do not change when the third
18
bid type is dropped as an alternative.13 For example, the relative odds of winning
for a fixed fee bid with respect to an hourly fee bid should be roughly the same,
irrespective of whether mixed fee bids are present or not as an alternative. The same
reasoning holds for the presence of other combinations of bid types. To check the
IIA assumption, we perform several generalized Hausman tests.14
In particular, we estimate the same model as in equation (1), but drop one
of the bid types each time. We then compare the coefficients of these “reduced
models” with the coefficients of our full model. If these are always the same then
the IIA assumption holds. Our tests can never reject the equality of coefficients. In
particular, when dropping mixed bids, the p-value of the χ2 test is equal to 0.95.
When dropping fixed bids, the p-value equals 0.19. Finally, when dropping hourly
rate bids, its p-value is 0.45. Therefore, the IIA cannot be rejected for our sample,
which leads to the conclusion that the conditional logit estimator is valid in this
context.
As an additional test, we re-estimate our main equation (1), while allowing for
correlation between the different choices (fixed, hourly, and mixed fee bids). To
implement this model, we use the mixed logit estimator and apply two different
optimization procedures.15 Both optimization methods exhibit no correlation for
any pair of choice alternatives and convincingly show that the null hypothesis of
these coefficients being zero cannot be rejected. Moreover, the tests where the mixed
logit model (with correlations) is compared to the logit model (without correlations)
show that both models are the same. In particular, the χ2-values indicate that the
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null hypothesis of both models being the same cannot be rejected; the resulting p-
values are 1 and 0.994 respectively. The mixed logit analysis thus confirms thus that
our sample complies with the IIA assumption and that, therefore, the conditional
logit model is the preferred estimation method as it is the most efficient estimator.
4.3 Lawyers’ previous auction participations
While our estimations should not suffer from an omitted variable problem (we include
all variables that are directly observable by the clients), one could still argue that
participating in previous XS2J auctions increases lawyers’ chances of winning. An
effect may come into play because, for example, legal experts of XS2J invite lawyers
to the auction that are known to have performed well in previous auctions and cases.
These lawyers may then be of a higher “quality.” If this difference can be in some
way transmitted to clients, then lawyers with more bidding experience may have a
higher chance of winning.
We therefore re-estimate our main model (1), but add successively three bid-
experience related variables. First, we include the number of times the office of a bid-
ding lawyer has participated in previous auctions (variable Prev Participationik).
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Second, we add the number of times the participating lawyer’s office has actually won
in previous auctions (Prev Wonik), with the underlying idea that winning lawyers
are perhaps of an even higher quality. Finally, to contrast experienced offices with
law companies that have no bid experience at all, the dummy variable First T imeik
is inserted. Exact definitions and summary statistics of these variables can be found
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in tables 2 and 4, respectively.
The results are shown in table 6. First, the number of previous participations have
no effect on the odds of winning a particular auction. Indeed, as can be seen from
columns (1) to (3), participation in other auctions yields a relative odds ratio of about
1, which indicates that offices that participate frequently in the XS2J auctions have
roughly the same odds as others. Moreover, the coefficients in all three specifications
are not significant. The same pattern can be observed for the other bid-experience
related variables. Offices that have previously won have about the same chance of
winning the current auction, and this effect is non-significant; see columns (2) to (3).
Finally, column (3) shows that first-time participants have a slightly lower chance
of winning with a relative odds ratio of 0.936, but this impact is again insignificant.
On the other hand, the main results stay robust to including these bid-experience
related variables. In sum, the bidding history of lawyers’ offices has no impact on
clients’ choices.
It is perhaps interesting to note at this point that lawyers with more bid expe-
rience do not offer different fee contracts, further excluding any possibility of endo-
geneity. Indeed, (non-reported) regressions show that both previous participations
and previous wins have no impact at all on the type of fee contract that lawyers
offer. On the contrary, case-specific dummies have more explanatory power, indicat-
ing that lawyers bid mostly depending on the particular case they are facing.17 This
therefore excludes strategic bidding behavior by lawyers in the XS2J auctions, which
might be explained by the fact that these auctions should be relatively unimportant
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for a law firm’s portfolio. The lack of strategic interaction allows us to focus solely
on clients’ choices.
[Insert table 6 about here]
4.4 Cases and clients
The XS2J auctions deal mainly with standard cases, while clients are mostly middle-
class private persons or relatively small companies. Still, our sample shows some
heterogeneity across legal disputes and clients. Accordingly, we would like to explore
here to what extent our main findings – that is, clients dislike hourly rate bids – are
similar for different case and client characteristics. Indeed, one could perhaps expect
differential responses if one follows the argument of some lawyers that hourly rates
induce optimal effort. According to this reasoning, for higher financial value cases
clients might prefer hourly rates, as a good outcome could then become relatively
more important than a low cost. Similarly, clients with more cash to spend might
be less interested in the cost side and would place a higher value on results. Thus, if
hourly rates are expected to deliver a better outcome then these should prevail for
those categories.
For this purpose, we re-do our main estimation of equation (1), but allow for an
additional different impact of our bid variables along distinct categories of cases and
clients. In particular, we add the interaction terms of bid types and dummies that re-
flect these different categories. If the reasoning of “hourly rates lead to higher effort”
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is correct, then these interaction terms could yield significant coefficient estimates.
First, we isolate the cases where no estimate of the expected financial value is
available (to neither bidder nor client). These cases are typically more complex and
potentially have a higher (emotional) value for clients. Indeed, they treat issues such
as child custody, adoption, and family and neighbor disputes. The outcome of these
cases arguably matter more to people than, say, a late delivery of a large batch of fruit
(of which the value is relatively easy to estimate). For 15 cases, compromising a total
of 88 bids, there was no financial information available. As one can see from column
1 of table 7, while the bid variables interacted with the dummy “Not Financial”
are all non-significant, the main effects of fixed and mixed fee bids stay significant
and positive (although the fixed fee bids lose some significance). Therefore, while
hourly rates are still the least-preferred fee type, the client’s choice is qualitatively
not different for non-financial cases.
Second, one may think that for those cases where a financial estimate was made,
a larger financial value may be of greater importance to clients. We categorize those
cases that are above the median value as being of high value (consisting of 43 bids
in 11 cases). As is clear from column 2 of table 7, the bid variables interacted with
the dummy “High Value” are not significant. On the other hand, the main effects
of fixed and mixed fee bids are still significant and positive. Therefore, cases with a
larger financial stake do not induce clients’ preferences to change.
Finally, one could argue that firms have more money to spend than private per-
sons, which in turn could make firms relatively more interested in the results (as
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opposed to the costs). We therefore differentiate between firms and private persons.
There are 16 auctions that were requested by private persons, in which 65 bids have
been submitted. Column 3 of table 7 shows that private persons’ choices are no
different from that of companies, as the bid variables interacted with the dummy
“Private Client” show no significant impact.
[Insert table 7 about here]
In sum, we do not find a different choice pattern when we look at distinct cat-
egories of cases and clients. These results first of all mean that our main findings
are not driven by one particular category of cases or clients. Moreover, our findings
here are also consistent with the reasoning that clients do not prefer hourly rates
when stakes are higher or clients have more money. Therefore, one may tentatively
conclude that hourly rate fee bids are not seen as inducing higher effort in relatively
standard cases.
4.5 Price versus quality
Do clients only choose on the basis of price or do they also take the lawyers’ quality
into account? The price is an important factor for clients in deciding which lawyer to
hire. As our estimations robustly show, the higher bids have lower odds of winning
by at least a factor of five; see, for example, the coefficients for the variable “higher”
in table 5. However, an element of “quality” also plays a role in the client’s choice
of a lawyer for our cases. Indeed, a more experienced lawyer has a substantially
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higher chance of winning the contract. In particular, our estimations show that
when having double the experience as other competing lawyers in the auction (in
years), this increases the chances of winning by a factor of about three; see, for
example, the coefficients for the variable “experience” in table 5. In addition, clients
obtain information about the lawyer’s location so that they can take that information
into account when choosing their lawyer (although it does not have a statistically
significant impact according to our estimations).
Furthermore, the type of pricing scheme could also be considered a quality di-
mension. A risk-averse client will consider a fixed fee contract to be of higher quality
than an hourly rate contract if the expected number of hours spent on the case is
the same; see also the next section on the relation between type of contract and risk
aversion. As confirmed by the auction organizer XS2J, lawyers who are “experts”
in the particular type of case that is being auctioned could in principle differentiate
themselves here from colleagues with a less perfect match of expertize.
But also in the market for legal goods in general, clients find it hard to assess
the quality of lawyers (Hadfield 2000). This is even more so for clients that need
a lawyer in civil court cases such as a divorce or adoption; these clients typically
need to contact a lawyer only a few times in a lifetime. Because of these substan-
tial informational asymmetries between lawyers and their clients, legal services have
the characteristics of credence goods, i.e., it is hard for consumers to judge quality
(Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Not only ex-ante, but even an ex-post assessment
of the provided services is complicated. This means that, although the quality of
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lawyers is of course important, clients in general have few tools to take this quality
component into account when hiring a lawyer.
In sum, the quality of the lawyer probably does play a role in the client’s decision
to some extent, even if clients choose mainly on the basis of price. The reason is
that the experience of the lawyer, the location of the lawyer’s office, and the offered
price structure could be informative of the lawyer’s quality. However, even if clients
can take some quality elements into account, for most clients, quality assessment of
legal services is difficult, not only in our auctions but also in the general market for
legal services.
5 Lawyers’ effort
The previous analysis shows that clients do not prefer hourly rates as a payment
scheme for their cases. However, it has been extensively argued by the defenders of
hourly rates that fixed fees (and to some extent mixed fees) run the risk that lawyers
do not put enough effort into solving the case to a satisfactory level.
To check whether this may indeed be the case and whether clients are satisfied
ex-post, we contacted clients in March 2011 and asked what they thought of the
services of the lawyers they selected through XS2J. Overall, we collected information
from 24 of the 57 clients. The reason for not having a higher response rate is that
we did not have up-to-date contact details; we tried to contact clients in March
2011, whereas the contact details date back to the period 2004–2008 (when the
auctions took place). While having a response rate of less than 50%, there is no
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sample selection bias. Indeed, all clients that we reached answered our question of
how satisfied they were with the services of the lawyers. The clients answers were
classified into three categories: (very) satisfied, acceptable, and not satisfied.18
[Insert table 8 about here]
The results of the survey are summarized in table 8. There are 19 clients who
were (very) satisfied, while four said that the service was acceptable, that is, got a
“pass.” Only one client reported that she was not satisfied. Furthermore, although
this client had chosen a fixed fee bid, we find no statistically significant differences
between the level of satisfaction and the type of bid.19 These responses suggest that
(i) there are no problems with lawyers’ effort level in general and (ii) there is no
connection between the bid type and effort level in our cases.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our results. First, to check the external validity of our
findings, in subsection 6.1 we argue that the XS2J cases do not form a self-selected
group of atypical legal cases by showing that they are a representative sample of
Dutch civil court cases. Second, in subsection 6.2 we provide evidence to support
our assertion that the fee structures of Dutch law offices are heavily biased in favor
of hourly fees outside the auctions, even though the cases offered in the auction
have similar characteristics as the cases in the usual market. We give economic and
historical rationales for why this occurs. Finally, in subsection 6.3 we provide a logic
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for why the XS2J auctions cause the form of compensation to move away from hourly
fees.
6.1 Representativeness of the XS2J cases
To check whether the legal cases put up for auction are representative, we first
classified the XS2J cases into the relevant legal areas, based on the case descriptions,
in order to see which categories they represent.
The XS2J auctions concern civil cases for which a lawyer is needed – handled
in civil courts.20 Civil courts in the Netherlands operate according to the Civil
Code books, largely based on the Napoleonic Code (Meijer and Sjoerd 2002). There
are four main categories in the Civil Code: “Natural Persons and the Family,”“Legal
Persons,”“Obligations and Contracts,”and “Patrimony and Property.”As can be seen
from table 9, all Civil Code areas are represented in the auctions.
[Insert table 9 about here]
Furthermore, we were able to find data on the aggregate statistics for civil cases
in the Netherlands in Van Velthoven (2007) regarding the monetary values and type
of plaintiff/defendant.21 Table 10 presents the distribution of the monetary value for
cases initiated by summons in civil courts in the Netherlands and compares those
values to the XS2J sample. First of all, as can be seen in the last column, the XS2J
cases represent a wide range of cases in terms of monetary value. Moreover, the
distribution of values in the XS2J sample follows closely that of summons in civil
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courts. Indeed, the categories follow the same ordinal ranking for both the civil court
cases and the XS2J sample. For example, in 34% of the summons cases there is no
estimate of financial value, whereas this is 41% for the XS2J cases.22 This is for
both samples the largest category. As another example, the category e1 – e5000 is
for both samples the smallest: 2.9% and 0% for the civil courts and XS2J samples,
respectively. A formal test confirms that both samples show the same distribution.
Assuming a multinomial distribution, the Pearson’s χ2 test shows a p-value of 0.22
and therefore cannot reject the equality of both samples.
While there are unfortunately no such detailed data on civil cases initiated by
petition, Van Velthoven (2007) reports that at least 50% of those cases in the year
2005 had no estimate of financial value. Thus, also for these cases this is the largest
category.
[Insert table 10 about here]
In terms of type of party, table 11 characterizes natural persons versus legal
entities by their role in the dispute in both the civil courts and the XS2J samples.
First, as can be seen from the bottom half of the table, the XS2J auctions represents
a fairly even distribution in this dimension. Furthermore, in terms of type of plaintiff,
the distribution is similar for the sample of Dutch civil court cases and the XS2J
cases; 50% are a natural person for civil court cases and 51% for the XS2J cases. In
terms of defendant, on the other hand, there are some differences: 52% are natural
persons in all civil court cases and 39% in the XS2J sample. Formal tests confirm
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these observations. Assuming binomial distributions, for plaintiffs the Pearson’s χ2
test shows a p-value of 0.38 and therefore cannot reject the equality of both samples.
For defendants, on the other hand, the Pearson’s χ2 test shows a p-value of 0.01 and
therefore rejects the equality of both samples.
[Insert table 11 about here]
In sum, given that the main areas of Dutch civil law are represented by the XS2J
cases, these are not a self-selected group of cases in terms of legal area. Furthermore,
both in terms of monetary value and type of party involved, the XS2J sample shows
a lot of variation and is similar to the general population of civil courts. Therefore,
the XS2J sample is a representative sample of Dutch civil cases.
6.2 Fee structures of the non-auction market
While the XS2J auctions include cases that are representative for the Dutch legal
market, our assertion is that the market for legal services outside the auctions is
biased toward hourly fees. In order to verify what fee structures dominate in the
non-auction market, we drew a random sample from the population of lawyers active
during the period under research and collected information on the fee structures their
law offices’ web sites offer. The randomization procedure is explained in detail in the
appendix.
As table 12 below shows, of the 319 offices for which there is information on
tariff structures, 277 offer as the only tariff an hourly rate and make no mention
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of any other fee arrangement. This amounts to 86.8% of all offices for which we
found information on tariffs. Additionally, 13 offices offer a standard hourly rate,
but mention somewhere less prominently on their web pages that, although hourly
rates are the rule, other fee arrangements are possible in special circumstances. This
amounts to 4.1% of the law offices with information. Therefore, more than 90% of
our sample for which there is information on tariff structures, i.e., the sum of these
two categories, is strongly biased toward offering hourly fees. Finally, 28 (8.8%)
propose several fee structures on an equal basis, whereas 1 (0.3%) office offers only
fixed fees.
[Insert table 12 about here]
Additionally, we looked at what the law offices that participated in the XS2J
auctions offer outside these auctions. Out of the 46 law offices in our sample, one
law office had ceased to exist and 12 do not provide information on their fee structure.
This leaves us with 33 law offices which have a web site and offer information on tariff
structures. As can be seen from table 13, 21 offices (about 64%) offer only hourly
rates, while for seven (about 21%), the default offer is hourly rates, although they
mention that other arrangements are available. Thus, almost 85% of the participating
lawyers are inclined to offer hourly fees outside the auctions.23
[Insert table 13 about here]
In sum, based on the findings of our random sample, it is safe to say that hourly
rates are the preferred fee choice by the overwhelming majority of law offices in the
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Netherlands. Even lawyers that participate in the XS2J auctions – and often bid
there with fixed fee structures – are biased toward offering hourly fees outside the
auctions.
The question is then why the Dutch market for legal services is heavily biased in
favor of hourly fees. We give first a general/conceptual explanation of why hourly fees
prevail in the legal profession and shortly discuss thereafter some historical reasons.
Our conceptual discussion uses the following, interrelated elements that contribute
to lawyers favoring hourly fees. First, legal services show characteristics of so-called
“credence goods”– goods for which it is hard for consumers to judge what quality
they need, even after consumption. Because it is difficult for clients to assess what
exactly and how much time is required to solve their case, lawyers can use hourly fees
to “overtreat”clients, i.e., work more hours on a case than is really needed. Second,
lawyers facing some uncertainty prefer to charge hourly fees as this allocates the
risk to the client. And third, lawyers can exploit these informational advantages and
transfer the risk to clients since competition in the legal sector is rather low as clients
suffer from search costs and switching costs. Moreover, some institutional elements
serve as an entry barrier into the legal profession, while others limit the competition
from within. We now elaborate on these three reasons.
First, because of substantial informational asymmetries between lawyers and their
clients (Hadfield 2000), legal services have the characteristics of credence goods:
clients often do not know exactly what services they need, nor how much they should
pay for them (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). For example, it is difficult for a client
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to assess the number of hours billed. There is no publicly available information
in the Netherlands on what would be a “reasonable” number of hours for certain
types of cases. Furthermore, even if the client believes the bill to be unreasonably
high, she does not benefit from filing a complaint to the Dutch Bar Association. A
disciplinary commission may reprimand the lawyer in question, but it does not have
the competence to impose any financial compensation. These disciplinary measures
are also confidential: the identity of the professional who has received a reprimand
is not published. This means that clients who seek a lawyer have no information on
past complaints about a particular lawyer’s billing practice.24 As a consequence, an
hourly fee both enables and gives lawyers an incentive to overtreat clients, i.e., spend
too many hours on a case.
Second, a lawyer can fully insure himself by charging hourly fees if there exists
some ex-ante uncertainty on the workload of a case. An hourly fee structure for
lawyers is essentially a cost plus (or C+) contract, which is common in the context
of public procurement.25 A C+ contract shifts the risks related to the workload from
the seller to the buyer. While this may be fine for a public agency, clients of lawyers
may be risk averse and hence prefer more certainty regarding their legal bill.
A lack of competition between lawyers enables them to shift all the risks to their
clients. That is, if lawyers were competing more intensely, we should expect to see
at least some risk sharing between lawyers and their clients. More specifically, we
should expect to see more fixed fee contracts (that shift all workload-related risk
to the lawyers) and mixed fee contracts (where lawyers and clients share the risks).
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Lawyers’ market power may originate from several sources.
The first sources of market power are search and switching costs, which are briefly
discussed in the introduction of this paper. Market intransparency further amplifies
clients’ search costs. In principle, a client could initially check lawyers’ web sites for
information. However, price information on the web sites of law firms is in general
too vague to make an informed decision. Related, price comparison web sites are
confined to ranges of hourly fees. Furthermore, a lawyer offering an hourly fee makes
it more difficult for the client to compare the price quote to other lawyers as clients do
not know how many hours the lawyer will charge ex-post. Indeed, a lawyer working
for an hourly fee may take on types of cases that he is relatively inexperienced with,
without running the risk of not being compensated for the time spent, while at the
same time potentially being able to increase his client base; see also endnote 23 for
additional information on this matter. This is a particular concern in the Netherlands
because most Dutch law offices’ web pages do not advertise precise areas of expertise,
but instead offer a wide range of domains.
Furthermore, there are institutional barriers to entry so that competitive pressure
from potential entrants is limited. The right to proceed in Dutch civil courts is
reserved for lawyers admitted to the Bar Association. Prerequisites for admission
to the Bar Association include an academic degree in law and a traineeship of three
years supervised by a registered lawyer with at least eight years of experience.
In addition, professional regulation restricts competition between registered lawyers,
as professional rules imply numerous limitations on how lawyers may pursue their
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business (Baarsma and Felso˝ 2005). For instance, there are limitations on employ-
ment (a lawyer may only be hired by another lawyer or another registered profes-
sional, such as a notary), control and ownership of a law firm (a law firm may only
be owned and controlled by lawyers), and cooperation (which is only allowed with
other licensed professionals). Furthermore, lawyers face restrictions on advertising
and the use of referral fees.
In sum, the regulation of the market for legal services may stifle competition
between lawyers. As a consequence, lawyers are hardly encouraged to offer innovative
pricing structures like fixed fees and mixed fees, as Winston et al.’s (2011 98) quote
further illustrates – “Our concerns about inefficiencies in the legal profession are
shared to some extent by practicing lawyers and government policymakers, but they
have yet to call for the sweeping reforms we call for here. The recession that began in
late 2007 prompted some responses by law firms to reduce the cost of legal services.
Evan R. Chesler, a presiding partner at Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, one of the
nation’s leading law firms, raised eyebrows by recommending that lawyers stop billing
clients by the hour and instead set a fixed price for the requested services to improve
the predictability – and apparent reasonableness – of legal expenses. [...] Changes
in billing practices and the availability of lower-cost legal services suggest that more
sweeping reforms are desirable.”
Hourly fees have been also traditionally promoted by the Dutch Bar Association
(Baarsma and Felso˝ 2005). Until 1997, it published recommendations on hourly fees
depending on the monetary value of the dispute. For instance, the latest announce-
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ment amounted to the equivalent of about e91 per hour for “small claims”and an
hourly fee of about e318 for disputes concerning a high monetary value. For dis-
putes of a non-monetary nature, the Bar Association recommended an hourly fee of
roughly e132. Since 1997 no such recommendations have been published. Never-
theless, the old practice of recommended hourly fees implies that hourly fees have
strong historical roots.
The current practice concerning legal aid also points to the widespread use of
hourly fees. If a client’s income is below a certain threshold, she qualifies for legal
aid. These are set by the Ministry of Justice and are expressed in terms of an hourly
fee. More specifically, the fee was set at e100 during the time of the XS2J auctions.
Thus, the default in the Netherlands is to set hourly fees.
In sum, hourly fees are favored by lawyers as they allow them to exploit informa-
tional advantages and serve as insurance against uncertainty. The use of hourly fees
is feasible since competition in the legal sector is limited. Indeed, consumers face
high search costs and switching costs, while on the supply side institutional entry
barriers are high and regulations limit competition between practicing lawyers. In
addition, hourly fees have strong historical roots in the Netherlands. Therefore, the
non-auction market in the Netherlands is heavily biased in favor of hourly fees.
6.3 The auction setting
In the subsection, we argue why lawyers would charge a different fee structure than
in the usual market for legal services. We do so by sketching an informal discussion
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on the mechanism that could be at play. First, all participating lawyers face direct
competition in the auction. Therefore, in order to obtain a case they must now make
more attractive offers to the client than in the usual markets where lawyers have
substantial market power.
Furthermore, typically, there is heterogeneity among participating lawyers for
each case. Indeed, as confirmed by the auction organizers XS2J, lawyers who are
“experts”in the particular type of case that is being auctioned can differentiate them-
selves from colleagues with a less perfect match of expertise, i.e., they can offer a
more competitive contract. This particular heterogeneity, however, is not observed
directly by clients, as they only receive information on the price and type of fee
offered, the city where the lawyer’s office is located, and on the years of practice.
But before bidding, the lawyers are explicitly reminded by XS2J that they may
offer fixed fee or hourly fee contracts (or a combination). In other words, they can
submit two-dimensional bids (pf , ph), where pf is a fixed fee he wishes to obtain if
the client selects him and pf his hourly rate. Let us assume that clients assign a score
to each bid of the type S(pf , ph) = pf + αph, where α can be naturally interpreted
as the number of hours that the client a priori expects the lawyer to work on the
case. The client selects the lawyer whose bid produces the lowest score. After the
case is completed, the winning lawyer will then be rewarded according to the actual
number of hours spent on the case, rather than according to his score based on the
expected number of hours α. Indeed, a lawyer typically hands in the bill for the
actual number of hours worked, if the contract is (partly) based on hourly fees.
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The above-described mechanism is similar to Ewerhart and Fieseler’s (2003)
model, where a buyer seeks to select a supplier in a procurement auction to complete
a project. In their model the suppliers’ cost functions contain fixed and variable
costs. Suppliers are heterogeneous in the sense that their “type” (e.g., the number of
hours they need to finish the project) varies between them. Suppliers know their own
type, but it is not observable to the buyer. Suppliers submit two-dimensional bids:
a fixed fee and an hourly fee. Bids are evaluated according to a commonly known
scoring rule that adds the submitted fixed fee and α times the hourly fee part of the
bid. The weight α for hourly fees is based on the buyer’s expected number of hours
the project will take. The contract is assigned to the bidder with the lowest score.
After the winning bidder completes the project, the buyer will compensate him ac-
cording to his bid and the actual number of hours spent on the project. Ewerhart
and Fieseler (2003) show that both hourly-rate bids and fixed-fee bids can emerge in
the equilibrium of the auction. First, consider a bidder who is less efficient than the
weight α of the hourly fee in the scoring rule, i.e., he expects to work longer on the
case than the buyer has estimated (where number of actual hours t are greater than
α, t > α). For such a bidder, it will be optimal to bid a strictly positive hourly rate
and a fixed fee equal to zero. In this way the bidder minimizes his total score without
sacrificing revenue when winning. Analogously, bidders for whom t < α optimally
submit a strictly positive fixed fee and an hourly fee equal to zero. As a consequence,
bidders either submit pure hourly-rate bids or pure fixed-fee bids in equilibrium.
There are differences in the details of the described procurement auction and the
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XS2J auction; for instance, clients in the XS2J auction do not announce their scoring
rule in advance. Furthermore, lawyers submit mixed fee bids, probably due to risk-
sharing considerations that are not in Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003). However, the
main mechanism could be similar: lawyers who are “experts” in the particular type
of case that is being auctioned are more likely to bid fixed fees, whereas others would
be more inclined toward hourly fee bids.
Unfortunately, we cannot directly test this theoretical prediction on the basis of
our data because we do not have the precise information on the specialization of each
law office. Indeed, their web pages invariably offer legal help in a wide variety of the
typical fields that small and medium-sized offices would offer.26 However, our empir-
ical analysis provides some evidence that is consistent with the above explanation.
When we run estimations of bid type on all the lawyer-specific variables we possess
– such as previous participations and years of experience in the legal profession –
none of these dimensions can explain much of the variation in bid type; see also table
6. This means that experience per se does not explain bidding behavior. However,
case-specific dummies do have explanatory power, indicating that lawyers’ bids de-
pend on the case they face. As such, a particular case may match the specialization
of the lawyers.
In sum, we have argued that lawyers are more likely to offer alternative pricing
structures in the XS2J auctions than in the usual market because the former environ-
ment is more competitive. In addition, we have offered a sketch of formal reasoning
to show why some lawyers offer fixed fees rather than hourly rates in the auctions.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the clients’ choice of contract in auctions where lawyers
compete for routine cases. Our dataset has the unique feature that lawyers submit
bids with the fee arrangement of their choice. We observe offerings of hourly rates,
fixed fees, and mixed fees. Thus, bidders do not stick to the usual hourly rate. This
allows us to study which bid type clients choose.
We find that hourly fees are clients’ least-preferred choice. This conclusion is
robust for distinguishing between different types of clients and cases, and is not influ-
enced by lawyers’ auction experience. Therefore, our results support the hypothesis
that market power allows lawyers to offer fixed fees in the market for legal services.
In contrast, our results are not consistent with lawyers’ oft-stated argumentation
that hourly rates are in a client’s best interest. An ex-post survey of clients confirms
this finding: clients are satisfied in general, and there is no correlation between fee
type and level of satisfaction.
Our findings suggest that selecting a lawyer through an auction may benefit
clients who are looking to solve an incidental legal problem. Indeed, soliciting offers
through an auction format forces lawyers to directly compete for and provide the
needed treatment. The usual safeguards on decent legal service provision are in
place through the auctioneer’s selection of lawyers invited into the auction.
Finally, we suggest several avenues for future research. While we have some
information on the ex-post level of satisfaction, it would be interesting for future
studies to have detailed information on the effective number of hours worked and
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the amount of money paid. Also, it must be noted that success fees (or contingent
fees) are limited in the Netherlands. Further work, therefore, could be to investigate
client preferences in other legal regimes, such as the US.
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Notes
1The philosophy of a recently founded and rapidly expanding Washington-based law firm, called
Clearspire, is in line with this logic. On its website one can read that “[...] The billable hour has
ruled the legal world, pitting the financial interests of the firm against the client. Clearspire replaces
time-based billing with fixed-fee project pricing.”(www.clearspire.com/end-billable-hour).
2While widely used in the United States, success fees are controversial in the Netherlands: no
cure – no pay is declared illegal. No cure – little pay is not forbidden, but the boundaries of what is
allowed are rather fuzzy; see http://advocaten.advocatenorde.nl/wetenregelgeving/vademecum.asp.
3While not applicable in our setting, the bulk of the (mainly theoretical) literature on fees for
legal services deals with the analysis of success fees, since these are widely used in the United States.
See, for example, Dana and Spier (1993) and Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) for excellent early
works, and Emons (2007) for a more recent study.
4The law firms participating in the XS2J auctions are short-listed on the internet site of XS2J,
http://www.xs2justice.nl
5A notary is licensed by the state to perform acts in certain legal affairs, in particular witnessing
signatures on documents.
6Our database is based on the e-mail box of the organizers of the auctions. The bids that we do
not observe – at most five bids – were submitted by fax.
7A client can also choose to refuse all bids in an auction. In most of these cases the dispute is
not awarded because the case appears without merit, which becomes apparent from the comments
lawyers make on the case.
8As noted earlier in the introduction, success fees are controversial in the Netherlands and
industry experts believe that success fees are rare in general. Nevertheless, in our sample we
observe 21 bids where the remuneration of the lawyer depends to some degree on the outcome of
the case. There are many ways to specify a success fee, and indeed, almost all of the observed bids
have a different structure. For instance, we observe a high hourly fee versus a low hourly fee in
case of winning versus losing. Another version is a fixed fee plus an hourly fee, the latter only due
when winning. We also see bids where the fee is based on some percentage of the case value plus an
additional fee (fixed or hourly), where the additional fee was in some bids only applicable in case
of losing while in other bids, only in case of winning.
9The observed lower bound of e100 for the hourly fees corresponds to e1 more than the hourly
fee a lawyer could earn by doing legal aid, which is set by the government at e99 per hour.
10There are no official recommendations given in the Netherlands for all case types that we have
in our sample, despite these being relatively standard. Also the auction organizer XS2J does not
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provide for an estimate of the expected number of hours. Thus, it is hard for a client to even have
a rough estimate of the number of hours that is reasonable in such disputes.
11Our definition of a higher bid corresponds to what is called a dominated bid or dominated
strategy in game theory (see, for example, Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
12In a limited number of cases, the client lives abroad. As distance here does not constitute an
advantage or a disadvantage to any bidder, we set the distance at 0 for all bidders in these auctions.
13One could further argue that the control variables represent “alternatives” as well. Table 5
shows that these do not change the odds of a particular bid type winning.
14The standard Hausman test relies on assumptions that are not satisfied in our context. First,
the estimated variance component estimation does not satisfy the required asymptotic properties.
And second, one cannot apply the standard Hausman test when errors are clustered. We esti-
mate the simultaneous (co)variance of our models via a sandwich estimator which can overcome
these limitations; see, for example, White (1996) for a discussion of sandwich estimators and their
properties.
15We use the mixed logit estimator in Stata 13 and first apply the melogit command, which
estimates our mixed-effects logistic regression and performs optimization by using the original
metric of variance components. This is the most commonly used methodology. We add to this
classic methodology an alternative estimation method, meqrlogit, which uses the QR decomposition
of the variance-components matrix. This method may aid convergence when variance components
are near the boundary of the parameter space, which would be the case if correlations of our choices
are close to zero. We do not report these estimations in the paper, but results are available upon
request.
16It seems more natural to us to include variables related to the office of the lawyer, and not
just the individual lawyer, as lawyers’ offices are easier identifiable by XS2J. Quality may be better
defined at the office level and information on previous auctions and cases can be passed on to other
lawyers in the same office. It must be noted, however, that results are qualitatively the same when
we include lawyer-specific variables.
17This finding is in line with Maheshri and Winston (2013) who report that the variation of
hourly rates in the US cannot be explained by several variables related to lawyers’ experience.
18Unfortunately, we could not gather information on the total sum paid and the number of hours
worked on the case. Clients expressed both difficulties remembering these amounts and a reluctance
to provide financial information.
19The correlation between satisfaction and fixed fee bids is -0.17 (with a p-value of 0.43), whereas
with mixed fee bids it equals 0.12 (p-value 0.57) and with hourly fee bids it is 0.05 (p-value 0.82).
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20Each of the 11 district courts in the Netherlands has a number of venues that deal with issues
related to the administrative sector, civil sector, and criminal sector. Criminal cases go to a separate
criminal court. Administrative cases, small claims (cases below a monetary value of e5,000 at the
time of our sample), labor cases, and those involving the lease of residential and commercial property
do not need representation of a lawyer, and go to a “cantonal court.”
21Quantitative information on Dutch civil court cases is scarce as information registration is done
at the local court level and no standardized procedures existed for the period of our sample. The
consequence of this is that, for example, exact case classifications are not available, and for many
cases there is no information at all. Although not representing the full sample of cases for the
above-mentioned reasons, Van Velthoven (2007) is to our knowledge the best available source of
information for the time-period of our sample.
22These cases are typically complex and potentially have a high (emotional) value for clients.
Indeed, they treat issues such as child custody, adoption, and family and neighbor disputes.
23These figures also tentatively suggest that lawyers who participate in the XS2J auctions might
revert to hourly fees outside the auctions, even when bidding fixed fees in the auctions. This
observation could be consistent with the reasoning that the XS2J auction allows lawyers to attract
new clients. The underlying idea is that once a lawyer has won the auction and has successfully
handled the case, the client will return to the same law office if she needs legal assistance for other
cases. But then, the lawyer no longer faces direct competition for the client so that he can charge
hourly fees if he prefers to do so. Such “bargains-then-ripoffs”price pattern is common in markets
where clients face switching costs (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007).
24Sources: Baarsma and Felso˝ (2005) and https://www.advocatenorde.nl/624/bedrijven/tuchtrechter.html
25For example, in the area of construction, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) show that sellers prefer C+
contracts over fixed-price contracts for relatively complex projects.
26While XS2J offered some anecdotal evidence, they could not provide us with a precise list of
specializations for each lawyer, as this is informal and not clear-cut knowledge.
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Appendix
Some examples of higher mixed bids
We give two examples of labeling mixed fee bids as higher. First, imagine that there
are two mixed bids in an auction, bids A and B respectively. Bid A offers a fixed
fee of e2,000 covering the first 11 hours and an hourly fee of e190 from that point
on, whereas bid B consists of e1,600 for 10 hours and subsequently an hourly fee of
e170. Bid A is clearly higher than bid B for any number of hours dedicated to the
case, and is therefore qualified as “higher.”Second, suppose there are two mixed bids
in another auction, bids C and D. Bid C consists of e1,500 for the first five hours
and after that charges e170 per hour; bid D offers e1,600 for the first four hours
and then e100 per hour. Bid C would be the lowest if the case takes four hours
(e1,500 for bid C versus e1,600 for bid D). But if the case takes seven hours, then
bid D would yield a lower payment(e1,840 for bid C versus e1,800 for bid D). Here,
neither C nor D is labeled as “higher.” Figure 1 depicts the four bids.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
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Random sample procedure of Dutch law offices
The random sample is drawn from a hard copy of the year book of the Dutch Bar
Association (“Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten”) of 2005. The reasons to consider
this book as a starting point are twofold. First, the XS2J sample consists of cases in
the period 2004–2008. As such, 2005 seems like a good proxy for the market for our
random sample. And, second, perhaps the year 2006 would have been even better,
but the Dutch Bar Association edited this year book only until the year 2005 as a
hard copy. Thereafter, information on lawyers has been accessible online (the web
site’s address is https://www.advocatenorde.nl/). However, retrieval from this online
database cannot be done randomly. It contains no list of the entire population of
registered lawyers. One can only search on name, location or keyword where for each
entered search string – e.g., lawyers that contain the letter A – a list of maximum
100 results is returned. Furthermore, the search results contain duplicates and the
returned list is not identical for repetitions of the same search string.
The 2005 book contains an alphabetical list of all individual registered Dutch
lawyers and information on all Dutch law offices in that year by court district –
about 3,600 in total. From this book, we have generated a random sample that
contains roughly 10% of all law offices, i.e., 362 observations.
Our randomization procedure is as follows. We took the alphabetical list of indi-
vidual lawyers as a starting point. As only individual lawyers are officially registered
in the Netherlands – and not law offices – this is the relevant unit of observation to
start with to produce a random sample. This list contains 69 pages, where each page
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consists of three columns with about 60 lawyers per column. We let the statistical
package Stata randomly generate nine page numbers, and for each of these pages a
column number (1, 2 or 3). This gave us a list of 362 lawyers and corresponding law
offices (i.e., approximately 9x60 law offices). When we encountered a lawyer working
for a law office that was already in our list, we replaced this lawyer by the first lawyer
of the next column, and so forth.
For our generated sample of 362 law offices we retrieved information of their web
sites on the fee arrangements they offer. Note that even though our sample is drawn
from the population of lawyers in 2005, we could only collect information on their
law offices’ pricing schemes from 2014, as this random sample was generated during
a revision of this article. We found 351 offices to still exist in 2014 and to have a web
site. While some offices changed the composition of lawyers or merged with another
office since 2005, only a few went out of business. On the offices’ web sites we looked
at whether information about fee structures is provided. This was the case for 319
offices; this also indicates that the other 32 law offices are thus totally untransparent
about fee structures.
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Tables
Table 1: Types of bids
Types of bids present # Auctions Total # bids Winning # bids
Fixed Mixed Hourly Fixed Mixed Hourly
Fixed, Mixed & Hourly 15 22 25 26 3 9 3
Fixed & Mixed 2 2 2 – 1 1 –
Fixed & Hourly 7 9 – 12 7 – 0
Mixed & Hourly 17 – 27 48 – 14 3
Fixed 6 14 – – 6 – –
Mixed 2 – 4 – – 2 –
Hourly 2 – – 5 – – 2
Total 51 47 58 91 17 26 8
Auctions grouped by types of bids present. # Auctions represents the number of auctions in each
group. Total # bids represents the number of bids per bid type that were offered in each group.
Winning # bids represents the number of bids per bid type that won in each group.
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Table 2: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Winik Dummy equal to 1 if bid i in auction k wins
Fixedik Dummy equal to 1 if bid i in auction k is a fixed fee
Mixedik Dummy equal to 1 if bid i in auction k is a mixed fee
Hourlyik Dummy equal to 1 if bid i in auction k is an hourly fee
Higherik Dummy equal to 1 for bid i if there is another bid which yields a
lower payment to the client for all possible ex post realizations of
hours worked on case k.
Experienceik The length of professional experience of the lawyer with bid i (in
years), relative to the most experienced bidder in auction k
Distanceik The distance between client and the lawyer with bid i (in kilome-
ters), relative to the most distant bidder in auction k
Prev Participationik Number of times that the law firm behind bid i participated in an
auction previous to auction k
Prev Wonik Number of times that the law firm behind bid i won an auction
previous to auction k
First Timeik Dummy equal to 1 if auction k is the first time that the law firm
behind bid i participates in an auction
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Table 3: Height of bid according to bid type (in e)
N Mean Sd Min Max
Hourly fee 98 178 30 100 268
Fixed fee 51 2,000 1,364 150 6,360
Mixed fee 62
- Fixed fee part 2,179 1,040 275 5,500
- Hourly fee part 154 30 100 239
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Table 4: Summary statistics
N Mean Sd Min Max
Winik 196 0.260 0.440 0 1
Fixedik 196 0.240 0.428 0 1
Mixedik 196 0.296 0.458 0 1
Hourlyik 196 0.464 0.500 0 1
Higherik 196 0.423 0.495 0 1
Experienceik 196 0.566 0.356 0 1
Distanceik 196 0.737 0.343 0 1
Prev Participationik 196 5.883 6.188 0 29
Prev Wonik 196 1.439 2.258 0 10
First Timek 196 0.158 0.366 0 1
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Table 5: Which Type of Bid Wins - Main Results
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed 4.370∗∗∗ 3.157∗∗ 3.499∗∗
(2.295) (1.546) (2.002)
Mixed 7.794∗∗∗ 7.512∗∗∗ 7.762∗∗∗
(4.082) (3.830) (4.233)
Higher 0.232∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.0918)
Experience 2.929∗
(1.667)
Distance 0.419
(0.292)
Observations 196 196 196
Auction hit rate 0.804 0.765 0.706
Log likelihood -50.59 -44.65 -42.26
χ2 15.41 20.06 21.83
The dependent variable represents the win or lose of a bid. We use the conditional logit estimator
with auction fixed effects. Coefficients reported in terms of odds ratios. Robust standard errors,
clustered over the auction are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Which Type of Bid Wins - Lawyers’ Bid Experience
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed 3.217∗ 3.130∗ 3.158∗
(1.945) (1.953) (1.974)
Mixed 7.325∗∗∗ 7.367∗∗∗ 7.352∗∗∗
(3.960) (4.009) (4.007)
Higher 0.152∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0888) (0.0855) (0.0853)
Experience 3.086∗ 3.181∗ 3.180∗
(1.810) (1.894) (1.886)
Distance 0.438 0.425 0.426
(0.311) (0.302) (0.304)
Participation Other 1.046 1.032 1.030
(0.0397) (0.0694) (0.0721)
Won Other 1.038 1.040
(0.164) (0.166)
First time 0.936
(0.560)
Observations 196 196 196
Auction hit rate 0.725 0.745 0.745
Log likelihood -41.75 -41.68 -41.67
χ2 22.78 23.64 23.75
The dependent variable represents the win or lose of a bid. We use the conditional logit estimator
with auction fixed effects. Coefficients reported in terms of odds ratios. Robust standard errors,
clustered over the auction are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Split sample estimations
(1) (2) (3)
Not fin High value Private Client
Not fin*Fixed 0.555
(0.630)
Not fin*Mixed 1.277
(1.406)
Not fin*Higher 1.182
(1.182)
High value*Fixed 0.615
(0.739)
High value*Mixed 0.452
(0.563)
High value*Higher 2.710
(2.950)
Private client*Fixed 0.309
(0.348)
Private client*Mixed 0.955
(1.119)
Private client*Higher 0.862
(0.915)
Fixed 4.152* 3.998* 6.968**
(3.301) (2.837) (6.106)
Mixed 6.925*** 9.809*** 8.128***
(5.108) (6.326) (6.423)
Higher 0.153** 0.133*** 0.164**
(0.118) (0.0835) (0.138)
Experience 3.164* 2.763* 3.321**
(1.989) (1.627) (1.856)
Distance 0.384 0.426 0.326
(0.276) (0.301) (0.236)
Observations 196 196 196
Nsplit 88 43 102
Auction hit rate 0.706 0.725 0.725
Log likelihood -41.97 -41.53 -41.67
χ2 20.73 23.71 25.20
The dependent variable represents a win or lose of a bid. We use the conditional logit estimator
with auction fixed effects. Coefficients reported in terms of odds ratios. Robust standard errors,
clustered over the auction are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Ex-post level of satisfaction
Fixed Mixed Hourly Total
Not satisfied 1 1
Acceptable 1 2 1 4
(Very) Satisfied 6 9 4 19
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Table 9: Distribution of XS2J cases according to main areas of Dutch Civil Code
# Cases % Cases
Natural Persons and the Family 16 31.4%
Legal Persons 8 15.7%
Obligations and Contracts 20 39.2%
Patrimony and Property 3 5.9%
Unclassifiable 4 7.8%
Out of the 51 XS2J cases in our sample, for four cases the case description was insufficient to
classify; whereas two other cases concerned two legal areas at the same time.
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Table 10: Monetary value distribution in Dutch civil court cases and the XS2J sample
Civil Courts (Summons) XS2J
e1 - e5,000 2.9% 0%
e5,001-e10,000 18.7% 9.8%
e10,001-e20,000 17.5% 15.7%
e20,001-e100,000 19.9% 29.4%
More than e100,000 6.9% 3.9%
No estimate of financial value 34.1% 41.2%
Statistics of civil courts are based on 51,877 cases initiated by summons in Dutch civil courts in
2005 (source: Van Velthoven, 2007).
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Table 11: The type of party —natural person versus legal entity— by their role in
the dispute: Civil Courts and the XS2J sample
Defendant
Natural Person Legal Entity Unknown Total
Plaintiff
Civil Courts Natural Person 31% 7% 12% 50%
Legal Entity 21% 17% 11% 48%
Unknown 0% 0% 1% 1%
Total 52% 25% 23% 100%
XS2J Natural Person 33% 14% 4% 51%
Legal Entity 6% 27% 4% 37%
Unknown 0% 6% 6% 12%
Total 39% 47% 14% 100%
Statistics are based on 220,220 cases in Dutch civil courts in 2005 (source: Van Velthoven, 2007).
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Table 12: Fee structure of random sample taken from Bar-registered Dutch law offices
Only Hourly
Rate
Standard Hourly
Rate
Several
Rates
Only Fixed
Fee
Total
# Law Offices 277 13 28 1 319
% Law Offices 86.8% 4.1% 8.8% 0.3% 100%
Information taken from law offices’ web sites in 2014. See also the appendix for a detailed
explanation of how this random sample is generated.
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Table 13: Fees of XS2J participating law offices, offered outside the auctions
Only Hourly
Rate
Standard Hourly
Rate
Several
Rates
Only Fixed
Fee
Total
# Law Offices 21 7 5 0 33
% Law Offices 63.6% 21.2% 15.2% 0% 100%
Information taken from law offices’ web sites. Out of our sample of 46 law offices, 45 still exist in
2014 and have a web site. Out of these 45 web sites, 33 offer information about fee structures.
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Figures
Figure 1: Mixed fee arrangements and higher bids
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